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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a variant of Answer Set Programming (ASP) with evaluable functions
that extends their application to sets of objects, something that allows a fully logical treatment
of aggregates. Formally, we start from the syntax of First Order Logic with equality and the
semantics of Quantified Equilibrium Logic with evaluable functions (QEL=
F
). Then, we proceed
to incorporate a new kind of logical term, intensional set (a construct commonly used to denote
the set of objects characterised by a given formula), and to extend QEL=
F
semantics for this
new type of expression. In our extended approach, intensional sets can be arbitrarily used as
predicate or function arguments or even nested inside other intensional sets, just as regular
first-order logical terms. As a result, aggregates can be naturally formed by the application of
some evaluable function (count, sum, maximum, etc) to a set of objects expressed as an intensional
set. This approach has several advantages. First, while other semantics for aggregates depend
on some syntactic transformation (either via a reduct or a formula translation), the QEL=
F
interpretation treats them as regular evaluable functions, providing a compositional semantics
and avoiding any kind of syntactic restriction. Second, aggregates can be explicitly defined now
within the logical language by the simple addition of formulas that fix their meaning in terms
of multiple applications of some (commutative and associative) binary operation. For instance,
we can use recursive rules to define sum in terms of integer addition. Last, but not least, we
prove that the semantics we obtain for aggregates coincides with the one defined by Gelfond
and Zhang for the Alog language, when we restrict to that syntactic fragment.
(Under consideration for acceptance in TPLP)
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1 Introduction
Due to its extensive use for practical Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR),
the paradigm of Answer Set Programming (ASP; Baral 2003) has been continuously sub-
ject to multiple extensions of its input language and, frequently, its formal semantics. One
of those possible extensions is the addition of evaluable functions (see Cabalar 2013 for a
survey). This extension allows us, for instance, to replace the conjunctionmother(cain,X)∧
mother(abel,X) by the equality mother(cain) = mother(abel) so that (i) mother can be
better captured as a function (a person has a unique mother) and (ii) it is not treated as
a Herbrand function, since syntactically different terms may refer to the same object. Al-
though several prototypes for functional ASP have been developed (Lin and Wang 2008;
Cabalar 2011; Balduccini 2013; Bartholomew and Lee 2014), the use of evaluable func-
tions has not been commonly adopted in the mainstream ASP solvers yet. Still, their
logical definition can also be useful for other common ASP extensions, as happened with
their application to constraint ASP (Cabalar et al. 2016). Another ASP extension that
can be examined under the functional viewpoint is the use of aggregates. An aggregate
is the result of an operation on a set of values, such as their cardinality, their sum,
their maximum/minimum value, etc. ASP introduces this feature via so-called aggregate
atoms, that allow comparing the result of an aggregate with some fixed value. To put
an example, suppose p(X) means that Agatha Christie wrote book X . Then, adding the
aggregate atom count{X : p(X)} ≥ n in a rule body checks that she wrote at least n
books. Defining the semantics for these atoms may become tricky, since it is easy to build
self-referential rules like:
p(a)← count{X : p(X)} ≥ n. (1)
to express that Mrs. Christie also writes an autobiography a if she writes at least n books.
Different alternative semantics have been proposed for ASP aggregates (Simons et al. 2002;
Pelov et al. 2007; Son and Pontelli 2007; Ferraris 2011; Faber et al. 2011; Gelfond and Zhang 2014)
but all of them have treated each aggregate atom as a whole, without providing a se-
mantics for its individual components. A different, and perhaps more natural possibility,
is to consider inequality as a standard predicate and interpret count(S) as an evaluable
function, whose argument S happens to be a set.
In this paper, we propose an extension of ASP with evaluable functions that allows
their application to sets of objects and the treatment of aggregates as functions. To
this aim, we start from the first-order logic characterisation of ASP, Quantified Equilib-
rium Logic (QEL; Pearce and Valverde 2004) plus its extension to evaluable functions
(QEL=F ; Cabalar 2011). Then, we proceed to include a new type of logical term, inten-
sional set, with the form {~τ(~x) : ϕ(~x)} and the expected meaning, that is, the set of
tuples ~τ(~c) for which the formula ϕ(~c) holds (having ~c and ~x the same arity). Intensional
sets constitute a quite common mathematical notation and, in fact, have been already
studied in the context of Prolog (Dovier et al. 1991) and Constraint Logic Program-
ming (Dovier et al. 2003). In our case, we will treat them as regular, first-order logical
terms, without syntactic restrictions, so they can be arbitrarily nested in other expres-
sions. One interesting feature inherited from QEL=F is that functions can be partial, so
we can use them to represent that, say, mother(adam), mother(eve) or division(3, 0)
are undefined, but also that the maximum value of an empty set max(∅) is undefined too.
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The new extension allows now to define new aggregates within the logical language. It
suffices to add formulas to fix their meaning in terms of multiple applications of some
(commutative and associative) binary operation. For instance, we show how to define
the sum aggregate using recursive rules in terms of integer addition. Finally, we are also
able to prove that, when restricted to the the Alog language (Gelfond and Zhang 2014),
there is a semantic, one-to-one correspondence.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall the basic definitions
of Functional ASP under the QEL=F interpretation. Section 3 introduces intensional sets
while Section 4 studies their use for aggregates. Section 5 focuses on the correspondence
to (Gelfond and Zhang 2014) aggregates. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background: Quantified Equilibrium Logic with Evaluable Functions
The definition of propositional Equilibrium Logic (Pearce 1996) relied on a selection cri-
terion on models of the intermediate logic of Here-and-There (HT; Heyting 1930). The
first order case (Pearce and Valverde 2004) followed similar steps, introducing a quanti-
fied version of HT, called SQHT= that stands for Quantified HT with static domains1
and equality. In this section we describe the syntax and semantics of a variant of the
latter, called SQHT=F (Cabalar 2011), for dealing with evaluable functions.
We begin by defining a first-order language by its signature, a tuple Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉
of disjoint sets where C and F are sets of function names and P a set of predicate
names. We assume that each function (resp. predicate) name has the form f/n where f
is the function (resp. predicate) symbol, and n ≥ 0 is an integer denoting the number of
arguments (or arity). Elements in C will be called Herbrand functions (or constructors),
whereas elements in F will receive the name of evaluable functions (or operations). The
sets C0 (Herbrand constants) and F0 (evaluable constants) respectively represent the
elements of C and F with arity 0. We assume C0 contains at least one element.
First-order formulas follow the syntax of classical predicate calculus with equality “=”.
We assume that default negation ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ→ ⊥. We use letters x, y, z and their
capital versions to denote variables, τ to denote terms, and letters c, d, e to denote ground
terms. Tuples of variables, terms and ground terms are respectively represented by ~x, ~τ ,~c.
By abuse of notation, when a tuple contains a single element, we write just τ instead
of 〈τ〉. When writing formulas, we assume that all free variables are implicitly univer-
sally quantified. An atom like τ = τ ′ is called an equality atom, whereas an atom like
p(τ1, . . . , τn) for any predicate p/n different from equality receives the name of predi-
cate atom. Given any set of functions S we write TermsF (S) to stand for the set of
ground terms built from functions (and constants) in S. In particular, the set of all pos-
sible ground terms for the signature Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉 would be TermsF (C ∪F) whereas the
subset TermsF (C) will be called the Herbrand Universe of the language LF(Σ). The Her-
brand Base HBF (C,P) is the set containing all atoms that can be formed with predicates
in P and terms in the Herbrand Universe, TermsF(C).
Definition 1 (SQHT=F -assignment). An SQHT
=
F -assignment σ for a signature 〈C,F ,P〉
is a function σ : TermsF (C ∪ F)→ TermsF (C) ∪ {u} that maps any ground term in the
1 The term static domain means that the universe is shared among all worlds in the Kripke frame.
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language to some ground term in the Herbrand Universe or the special value u 6∈ TermsF(C∪
F) (standing for undefined). The function σ must satisfy:
(i) σ(c) def= c for all c ∈ TermsF (C).
(ii) σ(f(τ1, . . . , τn))
def=
{
u if σ(τi) = u for some i = 1 . . . n
σ(f(σ(τ1), . . . , σ(τn))) otherwise 
As we can see, the value of any functional term is an element from the Herbrand Uni-
verse TermsF(C), excluding the cases in which operations are left undefined (i.e., they
are partial functions) – if so, they are assigned the special element u (outside the uni-
verse) instead. Condition (i) asserts, as expected, that any term c from the Herbrand
Universe has the fixed valuation σ(c) = c. Condition (ii) asserts that a functional term
with an undefined argument becomes undefined in its turn (functions like these are called
strict). Otherwise, if all arguments are defined, then functions preserve their interpreta-
tion through subterms – for instance, if we have σ(f(a)) = c we expect that σ(g(f(a)))
and σ(g(c)) coincide. It is easy to see that (ii) implies that σ is completely determined by
the mappings f(~c) = d where f is any operation, ~c a tuple of elements from TermsF(C),
and d an element in the latter. We call these expressions ground functional facts.
Definition 2 (Ordering  among assignments). Given two assignments σ, σ′ we define
σ  σ′ as the condition: σ(τ) = σ′(τ) or σ(τ) = u, for all terms τ ∈ TermsF (C ∪F). 
As usual, we write σ ≺ σ′ when σ  σ′ and σ 6= σ′. The intuitive meaning of σ  σ′ is
that both contain compatible information, but the former contains less information than
the latter: any defined function in σ must preserve the same value in σ′.
Definition 3 (SQHT=F -interpretation). An SQHT
=
F -interpretation I for a signature
Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉 is a quadruple 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 where Ih ⊆ It ⊆ HBF are two sets of ground
atoms and σh and σt are two assigments satisfying σh  σt. 
The superindices h, t represent two intuitionistic Kripke worlds (respectively standing
for here and there) with a reflexive ordering relation satisfying h ≤ t. Accordingly, world
h contains less information than t, as we can see in the conditions Ih ⊆ It and σh  σt.
We say that the interpretation I is total2 when both worlds contain the same information,
that is, Ih = It and σh = σt, and we abbreviate it as the pair 〈σt, It〉. Moreover, given
I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 we define its corresponding total interpretation It as 〈σt, It〉 that is,
the one in which all the uncertainty in world h is “filled” with the information in t.
An interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 satisfies a formula ϕ at some world w ∈ {h, t},
written I, w |=F ϕ, when any of the following conditions are satisfied:
i) I, w |=F p(τ1, . . . , τn) if p(σw(τ1), . . . , σw(τn)) ∈ Iw for any predicate p/n ∈ P ;
ii) I, w |=F τ1 = τ2 if σ
w(τ1) = σ
w(τ2) 6= u;
iii) I, w 6|=F ⊥; I, w |=F ⊤;
iv) I, w |=F α ∧ β if I, w |=F α and I, w |=F β;
v) I, w |=F α ∨ β if I, w |=F α or I, w |=F β;
vi) I, w |=F α→ β if for all w′ ≥ w: I, w′ 6|=F α or I, w′ |=F β;
2 Note that by total we do not mean that functions cannot be left undefined. We may still have some
term d for which σh(d) = σt(d) = u.
Functional ASP with Intensional Sets 5
vii) I, w |=F ∀x α(x) if for each c ∈ TermsF(C): I, w |=F α(c);
viii) I, w |=F ∃x α(x) if for some c ∈ TermsF (C): I, w |=F α(c).
The first condition above implies that an atom with an undefined argument will always
be evaluated as false since, by definition, u never occurs in ground atoms of Ih or It.
Something similar happens with equality: τ1 = τ2 will be false if any of the two operands,
or even both, are undefined. As usual, I is called a model of a theory Γ, written I |=F Γ,
when I, h |=F ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proposition 1 (From Cabalar 2011). I, h |=F ¬ϕ ⇔ I, t |=F ¬ϕ ⇔ I, t 6|=F ϕ. 
We define next a particular ordering among SQHT=F -interpretations. We say that I1 =
〈σh1 , σ
t
1, I
h
1 , I
t
1〉 is smaller than I2 = 〈σ
h
2 , σ
t
2, I
h
2 , I
t
2〉, also written I1  I2 by abuse of
notation, when It1 = I
t
2, σ
t
1 = σ
t
2, I
h
1 ⊆ I
h
2 and σ
h
1  σ
h
2 . That is, they have the same
information at world t, but I1 can have less information than I2 at world h. Again, we
write I1 ≺ I2 when I1  I2 and I1 6= I2. Nonmonotonicity is obtained by the next
definition, which introduces the idea of equilibrium models for SQHT=F .
Definition 4 (Equilibrium model). A total model I = 〈σ, I〉 of a theory Γ is an equilib-
rium model if there is no strictly smaller interpretation I ′ ≺ I that is also a model of Γ.
A set of atoms I is a stable model3 of Γ iff 〈σ, I〉 is an equilibrium model for some σ. 
3 QEL with Evaluable Functions and Intensional Sets
In this section, we define SQHT=S : a logic that extends SQHT
=
F with intensional sets.
Intensional sets are terms of the form {~x : ~τ (~x) : ϕ(~x)} where ~x is a tuple of variables
and ~τ (~x) and ϕ(~x) are respectively a tuple of terms and a formula with free variables ~x.
Note that, as opposed to terms in SQHT=F (and also in first order logic), intensional
sets are terms whose structure not only depends on other terms, but also on formulas.
Hence, we define terms and formulas recursively such that the definition of i-terms will
depend on the definition of (i−1)-formulas while the definition of i-formulas will depend
on the definition of i-terms. We depart from a similar first-order signature Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉
as in SQHT=F , but we build the terms as follows. For any i ≥ 0, we define an i-term as
any of the following cases:
i) every constant c ∈ C0 ∪ F0.
ii) every variable x.
iii) f(τ1, . . . , τn), where f/n ∈ (C ∪ F) and τ1, . . . , τn are i-terms, in their turn.
iv) the construct {~τ1, . . . , ~τm} (called extensional set), where m ≥ 0 and ~τ1, . . . , ~τm are
n-tuples (of the same arity n ≥ 1) of i-terms . If m = 0 we write ∅ instead of {}.
v) the construct {~τ :ϕ} (called intensional set) if i > 0, ϕ is an (i− 1)-formula and ~τ
is a tuple of i-terms.
Now, for any i ≥ 0, i-atoms and i-formulas are defined over i-terms as follows:
vi) if τ1, . . . , τn are i-terms and p/n ∈ P , then p(τ1, . . . , τn) is an i-atom,
vii) if τ1 and τ2 are i-terms, then τ1 = τ2 is an i-atom
3 Apart from atoms, we could additionally include ground functional facts f(~c) = d. However, we only
consider atoms here, for better comparison to other (non-functional) semantics of aggregates.
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viii) every i-atom is an i-formula,
ix) ⊥ and ⊤ are 0-formulas,
x) if ϕ1 and ϕ2 are i-formulas, then ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2 is an i-formula with ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,→}.
xi) if ϕ is an i-formula and x is a variable, then ∀xϕ and ∃xϕ are i-formulas.
A formula (resp. term) is any i-formula (resp. i-term) for any i ≥ 0. Note that v) is
the only case in the term definition that refers to a formula, but this formula has less
rank than the term, so the definition is well-founded. Terms i(C ∪ F) denotes all the
ground i-terms while Terms i(C) denotes all ground i-terms without evaluable functions.
Terms(C ∪ F) =
⋃
0≤i Terms
i(C ∪ F) and Terms(C) =
⋃
0≤i Terms
i(C) denote the set of
all ground terms and ground terms without evaluable functions. In particular, Terms0(C)
corresponds to the Herbrand Universe that includes not only TermsF(C) we had before,
but also all possible formations of extensional sets, that act as a new constructor. For
instance, if we have the singleton C = {c}, then TermsF(C) = {c} is finite but D addi-
tionally contains an infinite number of (finite) extensional sets including, among others,
the sets of tuples ∅, {c}4, {〈c, c〉}, {〈c, c, c〉}, . . . , or combinations of nested sets such as
{{c}} or {{c}, {〈c, c〉}}, etc. We also define SB def= Terms(C) \ TermsF (C), that is, the
subset of the Herbrand universe consisting of extensional sets. In the previous example
SB = Terms(C)\{c}. By HB we denote the Herbrand Base, that is, the set of all ground
atoms of the form p(c1, . . . , cn) with p/n ∈ P and {c1, . . . , cn} ⊆ Terms(C).
If we consider terms also formed with evaluable functions, we have thatTermsF (C ∪
F) ⊆ Terms0(C ∪ F) again, and so, every SQHT=F formula is also a SQHT
=
S formula
– obviously the converse does not hold, as the latter may contain set constructors such
as p({c}). Still, we could take each possible extensional set in SB as a kind of Her-
brand constant like those in C. Doing so, TermsF (C ∪ SB ∪ F) = D and, thus, every
0-formula over a signature Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉 is also a SQHT=F formula over the signature
Σ′ = 〈C ∪ SB,F ,P〉. Note, however, that intensional sets are syntactically different from
any SQHT=F term, so there are SQHT
=
S terms (resp. formulas) that are not SQHT
=
F
terms (resp. formulas) over any signature.
For any expression α (term or formula), we define next when an occurrence of a variable
is either free or bound to some quantifier/intensional set:
i) all free occurrences of x in ψ are bound in ∃xψ to its prefix quantifier ∃x
ii) all free occurrences of x in ψ are bound in ∀xψ to its prefix quantifier ∀x
iii) if x occurs in ~x, then all free occurrences of x in ψ and ~τ are bound in {~x :~τ :ψ} to
the outermost intensional set.
iv) In the remaining cases, an occurrence of x is bound (to some connective) in a
formula iff it is so in some subformula; otherwise, it is free.
As in the case of SQHT=F , when we write standalone formulas, we assume that all
free variables are implicitly universally quantified. Similarly, we write {~τ :ψ} instead of
{~x :~τ :ψ} when ~x contains exactly all free variables in ~τ . Note that intensional sets play
a role similar to quantifiers. As an example, suppose we want to obtain the maximum
number of times that the character Poirot is mentioned in an Agatha Christie book b,
and assume that predicate word(b, i, w) tells us that the i-th word of book b is w. We
assume by now that we have functions count and max on sets: their meaning will be fixed
4 Recall that, here, c stands for the unary tuple 〈c〉.
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later on. The set {i : word(b, i, Poirot)} collects all occurrences of word Poirot in book
b. Since i is the only free variable to the left of ‘:’, the intensional set is an abbreviation
of {i : i : word(b, i, Poirot)} revealing that i is being varied. On the contrary, variable b
is left free. Now, take the expression
max{count{i : word(b, i, Poirot)} : author(Agatha, b)} (2)
The left term count{i : word(b, i, Poirot)} contains a free occurrence of b while i is
bound to the inner intensional set. Therefore, (2) actually stands for:
max{b : count{i : i : word(b, i, Poirot)} : author(Agatha, b)}
that is obviously less readable than (2). However, in the general case, we may need to make
use of the explicit list of quantified variables. For instance, if we want to parameterise
the expression above for some author x and character y whose values are determined
outside the term (as part of a formula), then we would necessarily write:
max{b : count{i : word(b, i, y)} : author(x, b)} (3)
because the free occurrence of y in count{i : word(b, i, y)} could make us incorrectly
assume that it is being varied in the set, as happened with b.
3.1 Semantics
First, we need to define the domain in which terms are going to be interpreted. Given a
set S, let us define the set of all possible n-tuples of elements from S, for any n ≥ 1, as
Tup(S) def=
⋃
n≥1
{ ~e
∣∣ ~e ∈ Sn }
Our domain D is inductively constructed as follows:
D0 def= TermsF (C) D
i+1 def= Di ∪ 2Tup(D
i)
so that D def=
⋃
0≤iD
i. We also define the subset of D consisting of sets as S def= D\D0.
Definitions of assignments and interpretations are then straightforward: we just extend
the domain of σ from TermsF (C∪F) to Terms(C∪F) and replace the Herbrand Universe
TermsF(C) by its corresponding D.
Definition 5 (Assignment). An assignment σ for a signature Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉 is a function
σ : Terms(C ∪ F)→ D ∪ {u} that maps some ground term in the Herbrand Universe or
the special value u 6∈ Terms(C ∪ F) (standing for undefined) to any ground term in the
language. Function σ must satisfy:
(i) σ(c) def= c for all c ∈ D.
(ii) σ(f(τ1, . . . , τn))
def=
{
u if σ(τi) = u for some i = 1 . . . n
σ(f(σ(τ1), . . . , σ(τn))) otherwise
(iii) σ({~τ1, . . . , ~τn})
def=
{
u if σ(~τi) = u for some i = 1 . . . n
{ σ(~τ1), . . . , σ(~τn) } otherwise
where
σ(〈τ1, . . . , τm〉)
def=
{
u if σ(τj) = u for some j = 1 . . .m
〈σ(τ1), . . . , σ(τm) 〉 otherwise 
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Note that we added a third case (iii) for extensional sets, but there is no restriction on
the values of intensional sets: their meaning will be fixed later, once we describe the
satisfaction of formulas.
Definition 6 (Ordering  among assignments). Given two assignments σ, σ′ we define
σ  σ′, as the condition: σ(τ) = σ′(τ) or σ(τ) = u for all terms τ ∈ Terms(C ∪ F). 
Interpretations I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 have the same form as before, with Ih ⊆ It ⊆ HB
and σh  σt, but under the extended definition of assignment and Herbrand Base.
Definition 7 (S-satisfaction). Given an interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉, we define
when I S-satisfies a formula ϕ at some world w ∈ {h, t}, written I, w |=S ϕ as follows:
i) I, w |=S p(τ1, . . . , τn) if p(σw(τ1), . . . , σw(τn)) ∈ Iw for any predicate p/n ∈ P;
ii) I, w |=S τ1 = τ2 if σw(τ1) = σw(τ2) 6= u;
iii) I, w 6|=S ⊥; I, w |=S ⊤;
iv) I, w |=S α ∧ β if I, w |=S α and I, w |=S β;
v) I, w |=S α ∨ β if I, w |=S α or I, w |=S β;
vi) I, w |=S α→ β if for all w′ ≥ w: I, w′ 6|=S α or I, w′ |=S β;
vii) I, w |=S ∀x α(x) if for each c ∈ D: I, w |=S α(c);
viii) I, w |=S ∃x α(x) if for some c ∈ D: I, w |=S α(c).
As usual, we write I |=S ϕ, when I, h |=S ϕ. 
It is easy to see that rules i)-vi) for |=S are the exactly the same as for |=F . Rules vii)
and viii) are just the result of replacing TermsF(C) by D. From this observation, we
can immediately establish a correspondence between |=S and |=F as follows. Given any
interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 for a signature Σ = 〈C,F ,P〉, by Iˆ = 〈σˆh, σˆt, Ih, It〉 we
denote a SQHT=F -interpretation for the signature Σ = 〈C ∪ S,F ,P〉, for each w ∈ {h, t},
where the assignment σˆw is the restriction of σw to Terms0(C ∪ F) = TermsF(C ∪ S ∪ F).
Proposition 2. Any interpretation I and 0-formula ϕ satisfy: I,w |=S ϕ iff Iˆ,w |=F ϕ. 
As, in general, not all SQHT=S formulas are SQHT
=
F formulas, we cannot directly extend
this result beyond 0-formulas. However, we may still expect that what can be proved to
be a tautology using the SQHT=F rules, still holds for SQHT
=
S formulas. For instance,
the SQHT=S formula f = {~τ : ϕ} → f = {~τ : ϕ} is an obvious tautology which is not a
SQHT=F formula. However, we may replace every occurrence of the intensional set {~τ : ϕ}
by a fresh evaluable constant c and observe that f = c→ f = c is an SQHT=F tautology,
using this to conclude that it is an SQHT=S tautology too. To formalise this intuition,
let Fϕ be a set disjoint from C ∪ F ∪ P containing a fresh constant per each different
intensional set occurring in ϕ and let κ be a bijection mapping each intensional set in ϕ
to its corresponding constant in Fϕ. Let us also denote by κ(ϕ) the result of replacing
in ϕ each intensional set by its κ image. By I˜ = 〈σ˜h, σ˜t, Ih, It〉, we denote the SQHT=F -
interpretation for the signature Σ′ = 〈C ∪ S,F ∪ Fϕ,P〉 where, for each w ∈ {h, t}, we
have σ˜w(τ) = σw(κ−1(τ)) if τ ∈ Fϕ and σ˜w(τ) = σw(τ) otherwise.
Proposition 3. For any interpretation I and formula ϕ: I,w |=S ϕ iff I˜,w |=F κ(ϕ). 
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Note that, as illustrated by Proposition 3, intensional sets act just as new fresh evalu-
able constants with respect to S-satisfaction. To fix the expected meaning of each inten-
sional set {~τ(~x) :ϕ(~x)} we still have to relate its value in σw to the satisfaction of formula
ϕ(~x) in I. Given τ = {~x : ~τ (~x) :ϕ(~x)}, let us define its extension at I, w as:
ext0(I, w, τ) def= { σw(~τ (~c)) | I, w |=S ϕ(~c) for some ~c∈D
|~x| }
ext(I, w, τ) def=
{
u if u ∈ ext0(I, w, τ)
ext0(I, w, τ) otherwise
To put an example, if τ1 = {X ∗ n/X : p(X)} and I1 contains It1 = {p(0), p(1), p(2)}
then the set of tuples would be {0∗n/0, 1∗n/1, 2∗n/2}. Since the obtained set is finite,
its evaluation coincides with the case of extensional sets in Def. 5, item (iii).
In the example, if we have, for instance, σt(n) = 10, then ext(I1, t, τ1) = σt( {0 ∗
10/0, 1 ∗ 10/1, 2 ∗ 10/2} ) = {u, 10, 10} = u. On the other hand, if It1 consists of
the sequence p(0), p(s(0)), p(s(s(0))), . . . , we similarly obtain the set {0 ∗ n/0, s(0) ∗
n/s(0), s(s(0)) ∗ n/s(s(0)), . . . } which, being infinite, is not covered by Def. 5. With the
definition of extension, for σt(n) = 10, we get ext(I1, t, τ1) = {σt(0 ∗ 10/0), σt(s(0) ∗
10/s(0)), σt(s(s(0)) ∗ 10/s(s(0))), . . . } ) = {u, 10, 10, . . .} = u.
Now, given any interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉, we define the assignments σwI for
w ∈ {h, t} as follows. If τ ∈Terms0(C∪F) (i.e. not an intensional set) we can drop the I
subindex, that is σwI (τ)
def= σw(τ). If τ is an intensional set
σtI(τ)
def= ext(I, t, τ)
σhI(τ)
def=
{
ext(I, h, τ) if ext(I, h, τ) = ext(I, t, τ)
u otherwise
As we can see, we have two potential sources of undefinedness. One may appear because
some element in ext(I1, t, τ) cannot be evaluated, as we had before with 0 ∗ n/0. But a
second one may occur if the extension at h is different from the one at t. For instance, for
the same example, the extension of τ2 = {X : p(X)} at t is σt(ext(I, t, τ2)) = {0, 1, 2}.
If we had Ih1 = {p(0), p(2)}, then the extension at h would be ext(I, h, τ2) = {0, 2} 6=
ext(I, t, τ2) = {0, 1, 2} and so σhI(τ2) = u. We also define the interpretation Coh(I)
def=
〈σhI , σ
t
I , I
h, It〉. Note that Coh(I) is determined by the interpretation of predicates and
terms in Terms0(C ∪ F). In this sense, given a SQHT=F -interpretation I for the signa-
ture Σ′ = 〈C ∪ S,F ,P〉, by Coh(I), we also denote the interpretation Coh(J ) for any
interpretation J over the signature Σ′ = 〈C,F ,P〉 such that J = Iˆ.
Definition 8 (Coherent interpretation). An interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 is said to
be coherent (w.r.t. intensional sets) iff I = Coh(I). 
Definition 9 (Satisfaction). We say that an interpretation I satisfies (w.r.t. intensional
sets) a formula ϕ at w ∈ {h, t}, in symbols I, w |= ϕ, if both I is coherent and I, w |=S ϕ.
We also write I |= ϕ when I, h |= ϕ. Given a theory Γ, we write I |= Γ if I is coherent
and I |= ϕ for all formulas ϕ ∈ Γ. We say that a formula ϕ is a tautology if every
coherent interpretation I satisfies I |= ϕ. 
Proposition 4. For any SQHT=F -interp. I and 0-formula ϕ: I |=F ϕ iff Coh(I) |= ϕ. 
Proposition 5. Any coherent interpretation I satisfies:
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i) I, w |= ϕ implies I, t |= ϕ,
ii) I, w |= ¬ϕ iff I, t 6|= ϕ, 
Proposition 6. Given a formula ϕ, the following statements hold:
i) if κ(ϕ) is an SQHT=F tautology, then ϕ is an SQHT
=
S tautology,
ii) if ϕ is a 0-formula, then ϕ is an SQHT=S tautology iff it is a SQHT
=
F tautology. 
Nonmonotonicity is obtained with by the definition of equilibrium models for SQHT=S .
Definition 10 (Equilibrium model). A total (coherent) model I = 〈σ, I〉 of a theory Γ
is an equilibrium model if there is no interpretation I ′ ≺ I which is also model of Γ. A
set of atoms I is a stable model of Γ iff 〈σ, I〉 is an equilibrium model of Γ for some σ. 
Proposition 7. Let Γ be a theory just containing 0-formulas over a signature Σ =
〈C,F ,P〉 and let I be a set of ground atoms. Then, I is a stable model of Γ according to
Definition 10 iff I is a stable model of Γ according to Definition 4 with signature Σ′ =
〈C ∪ S,F ,P〉. 
Proposition 7 shows that our semantics is a conservative extension of (Cabalar 2011).
Furthermore, as we will see later, our approach coincides with (Gelfond and Zhang 2014)
and rejects vicious circles as shown by the following example from (Dovier et al. 2003).
Example 1. Consider the following logic program P1:
r(1).
r(2).
q(1).
q(2) ←Z = {X : r(X)} ∧ p(Z).
p(Y )←Y = {X : q(X)}

P1 has a unique equilibrium model 〈σ1, I1〉 with I1 = {q(1), p({1}), r(1), r(2)} and
σ1({X : r(X)}) = {1, 2} σ1({X : q(X)}) = {1}
Under (Dovier et al. 2003) semantics, there exists a second stable model I2 = {q(1), q(2),
p({1, 2}), r(1), r(2)} not corresponding to any equilibrium model. To see why, consider
the coherent interpretation I ′2 = 〈σ
h
2 , σ2, I
h
2 , I2〉 with I
h
2 = I2\{q(2), p({1, 2})} and:
σ2({X : r(X)}) = {1, 2} σ2({X : q(X)}) = {1, 2}
σh2 ({X : r(X)}) = {1, 2} σ
h
2 ({X : q(X)}) = u
Note also that any total, coherent interpretation that agrees with I2 on the true atoms
must be of the form I2 = 〈σ2, I2〉 and that I ′2 ≺ I2. Hence, I2 is not an equilibrium model.
Finally, note that I2 violates the Vicious-Circle Principle (Gelfond and Zhang 2014) be-
cause the truth of q(2) depends on p({1, 2}) which, in its turn, depends on the fact that
{X : q(X)} contains element 2. This last fact only holds if q(2) holds. 
4 Aggregates based on evaluable functions and intensional sets
From now on, we assume that F contains a subset A of function names of arity 1 used
to denote aggregate names and that each aggregate name f/1 ∈ A has an associated
predefined function fˆ : S −→ C ∪ {u} that computes its value as expected (maximum,
count, sum, etc). Now we further restrict Definition 8 to fix the meaning of aggregates:
Definition 11. An interpretation I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 is said to be coherent (w.r.t. ag-
gregates) if it is coherent w.r.t. intensional sets and, in addition, it satisfies:
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i) for f/n ∈ A, σw(f(τ)) = fˆ(σw(τ)) if σw(τ) ∈ S; σt(f(τ)) = u otherwise.
We say that an interpretation I is a model (w.r.t. aggregates) of a formula ϕ, in symbols
I |= ϕ, if both I is coherent and I |=S ϕ. Given a theory Γ, we write I |= Γ if I is coherent
and I |=S ϕ for all formulas ϕ ∈ Γ. 
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the terms ‘coherent’ and ‘model’ are under-
stood w.r.t. aggregates (Definition 11). In particular, we assume that A contains at least
the aggregate names count and sum with the following semantics
1. ĉount(S) = d if d the number of elements in S,
2. ŝum(S) = d if S is a set of tuples, each of which has as an integer number as first
component, and d is the sum of all first components of all tuples in S,
fˆ(S) = u with f ∈ {count, sum} otherwise. We also assume that P and F respectively
contain predicates ≤,≥, <,>, 6= and evaluable functions +,−,×, / for the arithmetic
relations and functions with the standard meanings. Similarly, P and F also contain the
predicate ∈ and the evaluable functions ∪,∩ and \ with the standard meanings in set
theory. As usual, we use infix notation for arithmetic and set predicates and functions.
We also omit the parentheses around intensional sets, so we write count{X : p(X)}
instead of count({X : p(X)}).
Example 2. Let P2 be a theory over a signature with set of constants C = {a, b} that
contains the rule (1) with n = 1 plus the fact p(b). 
The theory in Example 2 has no stable model. On the one hand, it is clear that
every stable model I must satisfy p(b) ∈ I. Furthermore, {p(b)} is not a stable model
because, every coherent total interpretation 〈σ, {p(b)}〉 must satisfy σ({X : p(X)}) = {b}
and σ(count{X : p(X)}) = 1. Hence, 〈σ, ∅〉 does not satisfy (1). On the other hand,
the only other alternative is {p(a), p(b)} and we have that I = 〈σ, {p(a), p(b)}〉, with
σ({X : p(X)}) = {a, b} and σ(count{X : p(X)}) = 2, satisfies (1). To show that I is not
an equilibrium model, let us define I ′ = 〈σ′, σ, I ′, I〉 with I ′ = {p(b)}. It is easy to see
that I ′ |= p(b). Furthermore, we have that:
ext(I ′, t, {X : p(X)}) = {a, b} 6= {b} = ext(I ′, h, {X : p(X)}) (4)
Since these two extensions are different, it follows that σ′({X : p(X)}) = u and, con-
sequently, that I ′ 6|= count{X : p(X)} ≥ 1. In its turn, this implies that I ′ is also a
model of rule (1) with n = 1 and a model of P2. Finally, it easy to check that I
′ < I
and, therefore, I is not an equilibrium model. As we will see in Section 5, this be-
haviour agrees with Alog (Gelfond and Zhang 2014), but differs from other approaches
like (Son and Pontelli 2007) and (Ferraris 2011) in which {p(a), p(b)} is a stable model
of P2.
Interestingly, the use of evaluable functions allows defining aggregates within the logical
language. First, let us recall the notion of (directional) assignment from (Cabalar 2011).
By f(~τ) := τ ′ we denote the implication5 (τ ′ = τ ′) → f(~τ ) = τ ′. Then, rather than
providing predefined m̂ax and m̂in functions, we can specify their meaning as aggregates
5 Note that τ ′ = τ ′ can be read as “τ ′ is defined.”
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max and min by including, instead, the formulas:
max(S) := X ← X ∈ S ∧ ¬∃Y (Y ∈ S ∧ Y > X)
min(S) := X ← X ∈ S ∧ ¬∃Y (Y ∈ S ∧ Y < X)
Clearly, max(∅) and min(∅) are always left undefined, because no rule body can satisfy
X ∈ ∅. Similarly, count can be inductively defined in terms of addition as follows:
count(∅) := 0 (5)
count(S) := 1 + count(S\{Y }) ← Y ∈ S (6)
That is, the cardinality of the empty set is 0, and the cardinality of any other set is 1
plus the cardinality of any set obtained by removing one of its elements.6 In general, we
can easily define aggregate functions based on any associative and commutative binary
function. For instance, to define the sum aggregate in terms of addition, we can just use:
sum(∅) := 0 (7)
sum(S) := sum(S\{Y }) + Y ← Y ∈ S (8)
If we now consider a program P3 containing these two rules, facts p(2) and p(3) plus
q(Y )← sum{X : p(X)} = Y (9)
we can check that it has a unique stable model I = {p(2), p(3), q(5)}. The stable
model I corresponds to the equilibrium model 〈σ, I〉 which satisfies the assignments:
σ(sum({2})) = 2, σ(sum({3})) = 3 and σ(sum({2, 3})) = 5.
5 Relation to GZ-aggregates for propositional formulas and Alog
A term τ is said to be arithmetic if it only contains variables, numbers and arithmetic
functions +, −, ×, etc. A (GZ-)set name is an intensional set of the form {~x : ϕ} where
~x is a tuple of variables and ϕ is a 0-formula. A (GZ-)set atom is an expression of
the form f(τ) E τ ′ with f ∈ A an aggregate function, τ a set name, τ ′ an arithmetic
term and E ∈ {=,≤,≥, <,>, 6=} an arithmetic relation. A GZ-predicate atom is an
expression of the form p(τ1, . . . , τn) with p/n ∈ P a predicate name and τ1, . . . , τn ∈ D.
A GZ-atom is either a GZ-predicate atom or a set atom. GZ-formulas are the universal
closure of formulas built over GZ-atoms using the connectives ∨, ∧ and → as usual.
A GZ-theory is a set of GZ-formulas. We say that a GZ-formula ϕ is ground when
there are no quantifiers and all arithmetic terms have been evaluated, that is, the only
variables occurring in ϕ are bound to some set name and the only arithmetic terms
are numbers. A GZ-theory is said to be ground when all its formulas are ground. The
following definitions extend the semantics of Alog (Gelfond and Zhang 2014) to arbitrary
propositional formulas (Cabalar et al. 2017):
Definition 12. A set of atoms T satisfies a ground GZ-formula ϕ, denoted by T |=cl ϕ, iff
i) T 6|=cl ⊥
6 For count and sum, we are assuming that set S is finite. Otherwise, we would need additional formal-
isation to deal with infinite sets and cardinalities.
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ii) T |=cl p(~c) iff p(~c) ∈ T for any ground atom p(~c)
iii) T |=cl f{~x :ϕ(~x)}E n if fˆ
(
{ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ T |=cl ϕ(~c) } ) has some value k ∈ Z and kEn
holds for the usual meaning of arithmetic relation E
iv) T |=cl ϕ ∧ ψ iff T |=cl ϕ and T |=cl ψ
v) T |=cl ϕ ∨ ψ iff T |=cl ϕ or T |=cl ψ
vi) T |=cl ϕ→ ψ iff T 6|=cl ϕ or T |=cl ψ.
We say that T is a model of a ground GZ-theory Γ if T |=cl ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. 
Given a formula ϕ(~x) with free variables ~x, by Gr(ϕ(~x)) def= { ϕ(~c)
∣∣ ~c ∈ D|~x| } we de-
note the set of its ground instances. By Gr(Γ) def=
⋃
{ Gr(ϕ(~x))
∣∣ ∀~xϕ(~x) ∈ Γ } we also
denote the grounding of a theory Γ. Furthermore, given some set of atoms T , we divide
any theory Γ into the two disjoint subsets: Γ+T
def= {ϕ ∈ Γ | T |=cl ϕ} and Γ
−
T
def= Γ \Γ+T ,
that is, the formulas in Γ satisfied by T and not satisfied by T , respectively. When set
Γ is parametrized, say Γ(z), we write Γ+T (z) and Γ
−
T (z) instead of Γ(z)
+
T and Γ(z)
−
T . We
also omit the set brackets when the theory is a singleton. For instance, Gr+T (ϕ) collects
the formulas from Gr({ϕ}) satisfied by T .
Definition 13. The reduct of a ground GZ-formula ϕ w.r.t. a set of atoms T written
ϕT , is defined as ⊥ if T 6|=cl ϕ, otherwise:
ϕT def=

a if ϕ is some atom a ∈ I( ∧
Gr
+
T (ψ(~x))
)T
if T |=cl ϕ with ϕ = f{~x :ψ(~x)}E n
ϕT1 ⊗ ϕ
T
2 if T |=cl ϕ and ϕ = (ϕ1 ⊗ ϕ2) for some ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
T is a stable model of a GZ-theory Γ iff T is the ⊆-minimal model of Gr(Γ)T . 
Theorem 1. For any GZ-theory Γ, a set of atoms T is a stable model of Γ according to
Definition 13 iff T is a stable model of Γ according to Definition 10. 
Let us return to Example 2 and recall we have shown that program P2 has no stable
model according to Definition 10. To illustrate the behaviour of this program with respect
to Alog (Definition 13), note first that the only possible candidate for being a stable
model is the set I = {p(a), p(b)}; otherwise, the rules would not be satisfied according to
Definition 12. Then, we have that P I2 corresponds to the normal program
p(a)← p(a) ∧ p(b)
p(b)
whose unique ⊆-minimal model is {p(b)}. Hence, I is not a stable model of P2. Intu-
itively, this is explained by the fact that our belief in p(a) depends on the extension
of intensional set {X : p(X)} which, in its turn, depends on our belief in p(a), forming
what Gelfond and Zhang (2014) call a “vicious circle.” According to the vicious circle
principle, set I should be rejected as a stable model. In our approach, the “vicious circle”
can be easily spotted by observing that evaluation of the set in world h is left undefined
because its extension is different from the one at world t, as shown in (4).
As an example of non-vicious definition, consider the following variation.
Example 3. Let P4 be the following program:
p(a)← count{X : p(X) ∧X 6= a} ≥ 1 (10)
p(b) 
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Again, the only candidate interpretation that satisfies all rules is I = {p(a), p(b)}, but
the reduct corresponds now to:
p(a)← p(b)
p(b)
whose unique minimal model is I, becoming a stable model under Definition 13. There-
fore, the same will happen under Definition 10. Let us put τ = {X : p(X) ∧ X 6= a}.
It is easy to see that I = 〈σ, I〉, with σ(τ) = {b} and σ(count(τ)) = 1, satisfies (10)
and obviously p(b) as well. Now take the smaller interpretation I ′ = 〈σ′, σ, I ′, I〉 with
I ′ = {p(b)}. Then, we have:
ext(I ′, t, τ) = {b} = ext(I ′, h, τ)
so σ′(τ) = {b} and, consequently, I ′ |= count(τ) ≥ 1. In its turn, this implies that I ′
does not satisfy (10) and so is not a model of P4. It is easy to see that there is no other
smaller interpretation I ′′ < I that satisfies p(b), and so I is an equilibrium model.
An interesting property of Alog is that
it is always possible to introduce auxiliary variables for the aggregate value. For in-
stance, we can always replace (1) by:
p(a)← count{X : p(X)} = Y ∧ Y ≥ n (11)
This transformation is not safe in other semantics such as (Son and Pontelli 2007; Faber et al. 2011;
Ferraris 2011). In particular, under these semantics, if we take n = 0, a program consist-
ing of (1) has a unique stable model {p(a)} while a program consisting of (11) has no
stable model. These two programs are equivalent in Alog and have no stable model. We
can generalize the safety of this transformation to any context, using SQHT=S :
Proposition 8 (Existential variable introduction). Let p(τ1, . . . , τi, . . . , τn) be an atom.
Then, p(τ1, . . . , τi, . . . , τn) is equivalent in SQHT
=
S to ∃x[x = τi ∧ p(τ1, . . . , x, . . . , τn)]. 
From Proposition 8, it immediately follows that rule (1) is equivalent to (11) with an
existential quantifier ∃Y in the body that can be trivially removed.
6 Conclusions and Related Work
We have extended Quantified Equilibrium Logic with evaluable, partial functions by in-
troducing intensional sets, that is, terms that allow defining elements in a set that satisfy
some function or condition. By providing a logical interpretation, we define the seman-
tics of these new expressions without any kind of syntactic restriction, so they can be
arbitrarily nested within standard logical terms and formulas. The new extension yields
a natural interpretation of an aggregate as an evaluable function applied to a set term.
As a result, the semantics of an aggregate can be fixed within the logical language, by
the addition of formulas fixing its meaning, rather than relying on an external, prede-
fined function (although we assume that some elementary set predicates are available).
This may become a powerful theoretical tool to analyse the fundamental properties of
aggregate functions. We have also proved that, when restricted to the syntactic fragment
of language Alog , our semantics coincides with that of (Gelfond and Zhang 2014).
Extensions in Logic Programming with sets can be traced back to (Kuper 1990)
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and (Beeri et al. 1991). The approach of (Dovier et al. 2003) is based on the stable model
semantics with a reduct definition, but does not include evaluable functions or allow com-
plex terms (beyond simple variables) to appear as the definition of intensional sets. Still,
an important difference for the common syntactic fragment is that (Dovier et al. 2003)
does not satisfy the vicious-circle free principle as defined in (Gelfond and Zhang 2014)
“no object or property can be introduced by the definition referring to the totality of
objects satisfying this property” (see Example 1). The approaches (Lee and Meng 2009;
Ferraris and Lifschitz 2010) or (Harrison et al. 2017) do not satisfy this principle either,
but still share our orientation of defining the semantics of individual components of an
aggregate. An important difference, however, is that these formalisations do not deal
with general evaluable (i.e. non-Herbrand) functions, while we use them as a starting
point and then understand aggregates just as one more case whose arguments happen to
be sets. This allows us a completely arbitrary use of aggregates as terms and of terms
inside aggregates, leading to expressive constructions such as (5)-(6).
Our future work will include the study of non-strict functions and their relation
to (Son and Pontelli 2007; Ferraris 2011). We will also study the possible formalisation
under Free Logics as in (Cabalar et al. 2014) or the kind of properties that allow functions
to be recursively defined as in (5)-(6), and their application to (Gelfond and Zhang 2014).
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Appendix A Proofs of results
Proof of Proposition 2. Just note that, by construction, the evaluation of every 0-
term w.r.t. I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 is the same to its evaluation w.r.t. Iˆ. Hence, for every
0-terms τ1, . . . , τn we have:
I,w |=S p(τ1, . . . , τn)
iff p(σw(τ1), . . . , σ
w(τn)) ∈ Iw
iff p(σˆw(τ1), . . . , σˆ
w(τn)) ∈ Iw
iff Iˆ,w |=F p(τ1, . . . , τn). Similarly, for any pair of 0-terms τ1, τ2, we have:
I,w |=S τ1 = τ2
iff σ(τ1) = σ(τ2)
iff σˆ(τ1) = σˆ(τ2)
iff Iˆ,w |=F τ1 = τ2.
Then, the proof follows by induction noting that the rules of |=S and |=F are the same
when considered the different signatures. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Just note that, by construction, the evaluation of every term
w.r.t. I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 is the same to the evaluation of κ(τ) w.r.t. I˜. Hence, for any
terms τ1, . . . , τn we have:
I,w |=S p(τ1, . . . , τn)
iff p(σ(τ1), . . . , σ(τn)) ∈ Iw
iff p(σ˜(κ(τ1)), . . . , σ˜(κ(τn))) ∈ Iw
iff Iˆ,w |=F p(κ(τ1), . . . , κ(τn))
iff Iˆ,w |=F κ(p(τ1, . . . , τn)).
Then, the proof follows by induction noting that the rules of |=S and |=F are the same
when considered the different signatures. 
Proof of Proposition 4. By definition, Coh(I) is a coherent interpretation and, thus,
we get: Coh(I) |= ϕ iff Coh(I),h |=S ϕ. Furthermore, by definition, I and Coh(I) agree
on the evaluation of every 0-term and, since ϕ is a 0-formula, it follows that Coh(I),h |=S ϕ
iff J ,h |=S ϕ for any interpretation J such that J = Iˆ. Hence, the statement follows
directly from Proposition 2 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 be a coherent interpretation. Then,
we have that I,w |= ϕ iff I,w |=S ϕ and it is obvious that I,w |=S ϕ implies I,t |=S ϕ
when w = t. The proof that I,h |=S ϕ implies I,t |=S ϕ easily follows by structural
induction. Note that, in case that ϕ is an atom p(τ1, . . . , τn), then I,h |=S ϕ implies
p(τ1, . . . , τn) ∈ Ih ⊆ It which, in its turn, implies I,t |=S ϕ. In case that ϕ is of the
form τ1 = τ2, we have I,h |=S ϕ iff σh(τ1) = σh(τ2) 6= u which, in its turn, implies
σt(τ1) = σ
t(τ2) 6= u and I,t |=S ϕ. The rest of the cases are as usual in SQHT
=.
Let us show that I,w |= ¬ϕ iff I, t 6|= ϕ. Note that, since I is coherent, we have:
I, w |= ¬ϕ
iff I, w |=S ¬ϕ
iff I˜, w |=F κ(¬ϕ) (Proposition 3)
iff I˜, w |=F ¬κ(ϕ) (by definition)
iff I˜, t 6|=F κ(ϕ) (Proposition 1).
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Furthermore, since I is coherent, we have:
I, t 6|= ϕ
iff I, t 6|=S ϕ
iff I˜, t 6|=F κ(ϕ) (Proposition 3).
Consequently, I, w |= ¬ϕ iff I, t 6|= ϕ holds. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume first that ϕ is a SQHT=F tautology and suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that ϕ is not a SQHT=S tautology. Let I = 〈σ
h, σt, Ih, It〉 be
an interpretation such that I 6|=S ϕ. Then, from Proposition 3, it follows that I 6|=F κ(ϕ)
which is a contradiction. Hence, κ(ϕ) must be a SQHT=S tautology.
Assume now that ϕ is a 0-formula. Then κ(ϕ) = ϕ and, as shown above, the only
if direction holds. Hence, assume that ϕ is a SQHT=S tautology and suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, that ϕ is not a SQHT=F tautology. Let I = 〈σ
h, σt, Ih, It〉 be
an SQHT=F -interpretation such that I 6|=F ϕ. From Proposition 4, this implies that
Coh(I) 6|=S ϕ which is a contradiction with the fact that ϕ is a SQHT
=
S tautology.
Consequently, ϕ must be a SQHT=S tautology. 
Lemma 1. Any pair of SQHT=-interpretations I1 and I2 satisfy:
i) I1  I2 iff Coh(I1)  Coh(I2),
ii) I1 = I2 iff Coh(I1) = Coh(I2), and
iii) I1 ≺ I2 iff Coh(I1) ≺ Coh(I2). 
Proof
First note that i) implies ii) and these two together imply iii). Hence, let us show that i)
holds.
Let I1 = 〈σh1 , σ
t
1, I
h
1 , I
t
1〉 and I = 〈σ
h
2 , σ
t
2, I
h
2 , I
t
2〉 such that I1  I2. Then, σ
w
1  σ
w
2
and Iw1 ⊆ I
w
2 with w ∈ {h, t}. By definition, we have that Coh(I1) = 〈σI1 , σIt
1
, Ih1 , I
t
1〉
and Coh(I2) = 〈σI2 , σIt
2
, Ih2 , I
t
2〉 and, to show Coh(I1)  Coh(J2), it is enough to prove
σJ1  σJ2 for J ∈ {I, I
t}. Note that, for every term τ ∈ Terms0(C ∪ F), we have that
σI(τ) = σ
h
1 (τ)  σ
h
2 (τ) = σI(τ)
σIt(τ) = σ
t
1(τ)  σ
t
2(τ) = σIt(τ)
and, for every intensional set τ = {~τ (~x) :ϕ(~x)} we have that
σI(τ)  σI(τ)
σIt(τ)  σIt(τ)
follows from Iw1 ⊆ I
w
2 . The rest of the proof follows by structural induction and the fact
that functions preserve their interpretation through subterms. That is, τ = f(τ1, . . . , τn)
and σJ1 (τi)  σJ2 (τi). By definition, if σJ1(τi) = u for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then σJ1(τ) =
u  σJ2(τ). Otherwise, σJ1 (τi) = σJ2(τi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and, thus
σJ1 (τ) = σJ1(f(σJ1 (τ1), . . . , σJ1 (τn))) = σJ1(f(σJ2 (τ1), . . . , σJ2(τn)))  σJ2 (τ)
and, by induction hypothesis, we get
σJ1 (f(σJ2(τ1), . . . , σJ2(τn)))  σJ2(f(σJ2 (τ1), . . . , σJ2(τn))) = σJ2 (τ)
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Hence, σJ1 (τ)  σJ2(τ)
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume first that I is a stable model of Γ w.r.t. Definition 10.
Then, there is some total coherent interpretation I = 〈σ, I〉 such that I |= Γ and that sat-
isfies I ′ 6|= Γ for all I ′ with I ′ ≺ I. From I |= Γ, it follows that Iˆ |=F ϕ (Proposition 2).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that I is not a stable model according to Defini-
tion 4. Then, Iˆ |=F ϕ implies that there is some interpretation I ′ ≺ Iˆ such that I ′ |=F Γ.
From Proposition 4, this implies that Coh(I ′) |= Γ. Furthermore, from Lemma 1, it fol-
lows that I ′ ≺ Iˆ implies Coh(I ′) ≺ Coh(Iˆ) = I which is a contradiction.
The other way around. Assume now that I is a stable model of Γ w.r.t. Definition 4.
Then, there is some interpretation I = 〈σ, I〉 such that I |=F Γ and that I ′ 6|=F Γ for all
I ′ with I ′ ≺ I. From Proposition 4, this implies that Coh(I) |= Γ. Suppose now that I
is not a stable model according to Definition 10. Then, there is some coherent interpre-
tation I ′ = 〈σh, σt, Ih, I〉 ≺ Coh(I) such that I ′ |= Γ. From Proposition 2, this implies
that Iˆ ′ |=F Γ and that Iˆ ′ ≺ I which is a contradiction. 
Proposition 9. Given a ground GZ-formula ϕ and a total coherent interpretation of the
form I = 〈σ, T 〉, we have: I |= ϕ iff T |=cl ϕ. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof follows by induction assuming ϕ is an i-formula
and that the statement holds for every subformula of ϕ and for every (i− 1)-formula.
Note that iii) is the unique non-trivial case.
Let A = (f{~x :ϕ(~x)}E n) be a set atom. Then, we have that
T |=cl A
iff fˆ
(
{ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ T |=cl ϕ(~c) } ) = k and k E n (Definition 12)
iff fˆ
(
{ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ I |= ϕ(~c) } ) = k and k E n (induction hypothesis).
On the other hand, we also have that
I |= A
iff E(σ(f{~x : ϕ(~x)}), σ(n)) ∈ Ih (Definition 7)
iff σ(f{~x : ϕ(~x)})E σ(n)
iff fˆ(σ({~x : ϕ(~x)}))E σ(n) (Definition 11)
iff fˆ({ ~x[~x/~c]
∣∣ I |= ϕ(~c) with ~c ∈ D|~x| })E σ(n) (Definition 8)
iff fˆ({ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ I |= ϕ(~c) })E σ(n)
iff fˆ({ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ I |= ϕ(~c) })E n (term evaluation)
Then, the result follows directly by defining k as the result of evaluating the expression
fˆ({ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ I |= ϕ(~c) }). 
Proposition 10. Given a ground GZ-formula ϕ and some coherent interpretation I, we
have:
i) I,t |= ϕ iff T |=cl ϕ, and
ii) I |= ϕ iff H |=cl ϕT . 
Proof of Proposition 10. First, note that i) follows directly from Proposition 9. So,
let us prove ii).
Assume that I is of the form I = 〈σh, σt, H, T 〉. If ϕ is an ground GZ-atom a, then I |= ϕ
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iff a ∈ H ⊆ T iff H |=cl ϕT . Otherwise, we proceed by induction assuming that ϕ is an
i-formula and that the statement holds for all subformulas of ϕ and all (i− 1)-formulas.
If ϕ is a set atom of the form A = f{~x :ψ(~x)}E n. Then, I |= A implies I, t |= A
(Proposition 5) which, in its turn, implies T |=cl A (Proposition 9) and, thus, we get
AT =
( ∧
Gr
+
T (ψ(~x))
)T
. Furthermore, I |= A also implies
σh(f{~x :ψ(~x)}) 6= u σh(n) = n 6= u
By definition of term evaluation the former implies
σh({~x :ψ(~x)}) 6= u
and, by the definition of coherent interpretation, this implies
σh({~x :ψ(~x)}) = σt({~x :ψ(~x)})
= { σh(~τ [~x/~c])
∣∣ I, h |=S ψ(~c) for some ~c ∈ D|~x| }
= { σt(~τ [~x/~c])
∣∣ I, t |=S ψ(~c) for some ~c ∈ D|~x| }
and, thus, I, h |= ψ(~c) iff I, t |= ψ(~c) iff T |=cl ψ(~c) (Proposition 9) for all ~c ∈ D
|~x|. This
implies
I |=
∧
Gr
+
T (ψ(~x)) =
∧
{ ψ(~c) ∈ Gr(T )
∣∣ and T |=cl ψ(~c) }
Since this is a (i− 1)-formula, by induction hypothesis, we get
H |=cl
( ∧
Gr
+
T (ψ(~x))
)T
= AT
Assume now that H |=cl AT , then T |=cl A and we get
fˆ
(
{ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ T |=cl ψ(~c) } )E n
which implies fˆ
(
{ ~c ∈ D|~x|
∣∣ I, t |=S ψ(~c) } ) E n. From this and Definition 8, we get
fˆ
(
σt({~x : ψ(~x)})
)
E n and, in its turn, from this and Definition 11 we get
σt(f{~x : ψ(~x)})E σt(n)
Hence, we obtain that I, t |= A. Furthermore, H |=cl A
T =
( ∧
Gr
+
T (ψ(~x))
)T
implies
that, for all ~c ∈ D|~x|, H |=cl ψ(~c)
T whenever T |=cl ψ(~c). By induction hypothesis, this
implies that I |= ψ(~c)T holds whenever T |=cl ψ(~c). and, thus, we get that I, t |=S ψ(~c)
implies I |=S ψ(~c) for all ~c ∈ D|~x|. Hence,
σt({~x :ψ(~x)}) = σh({~x :ψ(~x)})
and, thus, that I |= A.
The cases for connective ∧, ∨ and → follow by structural induction as in Lemma 1
from (?): I |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 (resp. I |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
iff I |= ϕ1 and (resp. or) I |= ϕ2
iff H |=cl ϕT1 and (resp. or) H |=cl ϕ
t
2
iff H |=cl ϕT1 ∧ ϕ
T
2 (resp. H |=cl ϕ
T
1 ∨ ϕ
T
2 )
iff H |=cl (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)T (resp. H |=cl (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)T ).
Finally, I |= ϕ1 → ϕ2
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iff both I, h 6|= ϕ1 or I, h |= ϕ2 and I, t 6|= ϕ1 or I, t |= ϕ2
iff both I 6|= ϕ1 or I |=cl ϕ2 and T 6|=cl ϕ1 or T |=cl ϕ2
iff both H 6|=cl ϕT1 or H |=cl ϕ
T
2 and T 6|=cl ϕ1 or T |=cl ϕ2
iff both H |=cl ϕT1 → ϕ
T
2 and T |=cl ϕ1 → ϕ2
iff both H 6|=cl ϕT1 → ϕ
T
2 and ϕ
T = ϕT1 → ϕ
T
2
iff H |=cl ϕ
T 
Lemma 2. Let Γ be any GZ-theory and let I be any coherent interpretation and T be a
set of atoms. Then,
i) I |= Γ iff I |= Gr(Γ),
ii) T is a stable model of Γ iff T is a stable model of Gr(Γ). 
Proof
By definition, we get: I |= Γ
iff I |= ∀~xϕ(~x) for all ϕ(~x) ∈ Γ
iff I |= ϕ(~c) for all ϕ(~x) ∈ Γ and all ~c ∈ D|~x|
iff I |= ϕ(~c) for all ϕ(~x) ∈ Gr(Γ) = { ϕ(~c)
∣∣ ∀~xϕ(~x) ∈ Γ and ~c ∈ D|~x| }
iff I |= Gr(Γ).
Furthermore, T is a stable model of Γ
iff there is some total coherent interpretation I = 〈σ, T 〉 which is an equilibrium model
of Γ
iff there is some total coherent interpretation I = 〈σ, T 〉 which is an ≺-minimal model
of Γ
iff there is some total coherent interpretation I = 〈σ, T 〉 which is an ≺-minimal model
of Gr(Γ)
iff T is a stable model of Γ.
Proof of Theorem 1. First note that, from Definition 13 and Lemma 2, we have that
T is a stable model of Γ iff T is a stable model of Gr(Γ) according to both Definitions.
Hence, we assume without loss of generality that Γ is ground.
Let I = 〈σ, T 〉 be a total coherent interpretation. Then, from Proposition 10, we get that
I |= Γ iff T |=cl ΓT . Let us show now that if T is the ⊆-minimal model of ΓT , then I
is an equilibrium model of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that this does not
hold. Then, there is a some coherent interpretation I ′ = 〈σh, σt, H, T 〉 such that I ′  I
and I |= Γ, but I ′ 6 I. Note that, from Proposition 10, I ′ |= Γ implies H |=cl Γ
T while,
since I ′ is coherent, I ′  I and I ′ 6 I imply H ⊂ T (note that all evaluable functions
are aggregates and, thus, σh and σt are fully determined by H and T , respectively) which
is a contradiction with the assumption.
The other way around. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that I is an equilibrium
model of Γ, but T is not the ⊆-minimal model of ΓT . Then there is some set H ⊂ T
that satisfies H |=cl ΓT and, from Proposition 10, this implies I ′ = 〈σh, σt, H, T 〉 |= Γ
and that I ′ ≺ I which contradicts the fact that I is a stable model of Γ. 
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Proof of Proposition 8. Let I = 〈σh, σt, Ih, It〉 be some coherent interpretation. If ϕ
is an atom, by definition, we have that I |=S ∃x, x = τi ∧ p(τ1, . . . , x, . . . , τn)
iff I |=S c = τi ∧ p(τ1, . . . , c, . . . , τn) for some c ∈ Terms
0(C)
iff I |=S c = τi and I |=S p(τ1, . . . , c, . . . , τn) for some c ∈ Terms
0(C)
iff σh(c) = σh(τi) 6= u and p(σh(τ1), . . . , σh(c), . . . , σh(τn)) ∈ Ih for some constant
c ∈ Terms0(C)
iff σh(c) = σh(τi) 6= u and p(σ
h(τ1), . . . , σ
h(τi), . . . , σ
h(τn)) ∈ I
h for some constant
c ∈ Terms0(C)
iff σh(τi) 6= u and p(σh(τ1), . . . , σh(τi), . . . , σh(τn)) ∈ Ih
iff p(σh(τ1), . . . , σ
h(τi), . . . , σ
h(τn)) ∈ Ih
iff I |=S p(τ1, . . . , τi, . . . , τn). 
